The second part of the Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading 1 and of its implementing regulations (ordinances) 2 came into force on January 1, 1998. This article aims to contribute to a general survey of the first rulings handed down in application of this regulation.
I. Public takeover offers
The Takeover Board publishes its practice, and the legal texts applicable, continuously on its Internet site 
A. Scope of application of the regulation

Spontaneous offers
Generally speaking a public takeover offer is intended to obtain or to strengthen the control of the offeror over the offeree. However, this is not always the case. Some public offers have only marginal influence over the shareholder structure. This may be the case in particular with transactions in which the shares of an operating company are exchanged against the shares of a holding company 6 , or of offers put forward by an issuer for a small proportion of its own shares.
There is a greater need for regulation in corporate takeovers than in public offers which have no influence on control 7 . In theory, two approaches are possible:
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(Public takeover offers, disclosure of shareholdings, squeeze out) By Dr. Jacques Iffland, Zurich * -either to exclude public offers with no influence on control from the scope of regulation, -or to subject these transactions, while reserving possibilities of exemption, taking into account their particular character.
Under the aegis of the Swiss Take-Over Code that was then in force, the Commission for Regulation and the Swiss Exchange had generally opted for the first solution 8 . However, the entry into force of the Stock Exchange Act saw confirmation 9 of a trend to have recourse to the second. Thus, the new Takeover Board noted that the absence of change in the shareholder structure did not exclude application of the rules on public takeover offers, but could only justify certain exceptions to the latter 10 . The Takeover Board and the FBC also ruled that public offers put forward by an issuer on its own equity securities are subject to the regulations on public takeover offers regardless of the impact which these operations may have on the shareholder structure 11 . However, according to the FBC, these buybacks may be exempted not only from some of the rules of the Takeover Ordinance, but even from the whole of the Stock Exchange Act 12 .
*
The author is legal adviser to the Takeover Board. In its Vision ruling of March 4, 1998, the FBC took another step, considering that art. 22 ff. SESTA is applicable to «buyback programmes», i.e. announcements by which issuers state their intention to buy back their shares on the market 13 . Implicitly, this decision indicates that the idea of an «offer» may be interpreted more widely in the regulations on public takeover offers than in the Code of Obligations (CO). It also raises a delicate question: Are the rules on public takeover offers applicable to any announcement of an intention to intervene on the market, or only to those made by the issuer? In the absence of a legal basis making it possible to distinguish offers put forward by the issuers from those presented by third parties, the first solution seems to be the case.
The takeover regulation applies to public takeover bids for the equity securities of Swiss companies that have at least one class of their equity securities listed on a stock exchange in Switzerland 14 . The Takeover Board leaves it to the decision of the stock exchange concerned to determine if a share is «listed» in terms of the meaning in art. 22 and 2 let. c SESTA. An offer limited to shares of which listing has been suspended is still subject to the takeover regulations, if the stock exchange concerned does not assimilate that suspension to delisting 15 .
Mandatory Offers
The Stock Exchange Act makes organised groups subject to different regulations with regard to the announcement of shareholdings and mandatory offers. The transfer of a holding within a group does not give rise to any obligation to announce 16 . It is different for a mandatory offer. An obligation to present an offer is triggered if one determining threshold is exceeded: -either by the group itself, -or by one of its members, individually 17 .
Thus, a spontaneous offer may be subject to the rules on mandatory offers, even though it is put forward by a company in the major shareholder group and therefore does not affect control of the offeree 18 . As with spontaneous offers 19 , the absence of influence on control does not necessarily exclude subjection to the regulations, but allows for the granting of exemptions 20 .
B. Interpretation of the takeover regulations
Spontaneous Offers
The new regulations codify in large part the practice developed by the Commission for Regulation of the Swiss Exchange under the aegis of the Swiss TakeOver Code. However, it also contains several important innovations. In particular, it requires the Board of the offeree to publish a report stating the position taken on the offer 21 , the grounds for which must be given in the report 22 . The referral to a report drawn up by a third party attesting to the equitable nature of the price offered does not dispense the Board from this obligation 23 . If the Board bases its statement of position on the opinion of an independent third party 24 , this opinion must itself indicate the reasons on which it is based. It becomes an integral part of the Board's report and must therefore be published in the same way. If it is not reproduced in full in the Board's report, any interested party must be able to obtain a copy of it free of charge 25 . The Takeover Board is competent to determine whether the Board's report complies with the legal requirements 26 . However, the review body is not required to check the contents of this document 27 . Offers published between the end of a business year and the publication of that year's results raise a delicate problem with which the Commission for Regulation had already been confronted under the aegis of 13 
The Takeover Board has also had occasion to pronounce upon the extent of the «best price rule» described in art. 24.2 SESTA and 10.6 TOO. It has stated that this rule does not only apply within the duration of the offer, but also during the six months following the end of the additional acceptance period described in art. 14.5 TOO 30 . The offeror cannot therefore pay more than the offer price to certain shareholders during that period without violating the principle of equal treatment.
Buyback of own shares
After consultation of the Federal Banking Commission, the Takeover Board has published the criteria that a public offer or a programme to buyback own equity securities should satisfy to benefit from the exemption regulations introduced by the Vision ruling 31 . This communication replaces former Communication no. 1 of November 3, 1997. The latter text still excluded certain types of buybacks from the scope of the takeover regulations, which the Vision ruling does not allow any more 32 . The new communication makes it possible to exempt offers and buyback programmes that safeguard «equal treatment, transparency, fairness and good faith». In concrete terms, the communication tends to exempt operations which are unlikely to affect the control of the issuer or the liquidity of the securities concerned, and which meet certain minimal standards of transparency.
Since the adoption of Communication no. 1, the Takeover Board has exempted several offers 33 and buyback programmes from application of the takeover regulations. The buyback programmes are often carried out by special trading lines, on which the issuer's broker alone may introduce the bid prices 34 . This procedure makes it possible to levy the withholding tax which has to be charged when the shares are acquired in order to be cancelled. However, the application of the takeover regulations is not limited to the buyback of shares carried out on a special trading line. The announcement of an intention to acquire the shares on the ordinary trading line constitutes a «public takeover offer» in the meaning of art. 2 let. e SESTA and must therefore be the object of an exemption procedure 35 . In theory, the reasons for which a buyback programme is published are irrelevant. However, the Takeover Board has stated that it doubted that buybacks implemented with the aim of influencing prices are compatible with company law. It has also cast doubt that respect for the provisions of art. 659 CO shelters the issuer from all liability under the securities laws 36 . A recent recommendation allows it to be supposed that the Takeover Board may subject the exemption of buyback programmes to a new condition. In the context of the procedure on the extension of the programme of Schindler Holding AG, the Takeover Board noted, incidentally, that in a market controlled by the offeror, the stock exchange prices at which the buybacks were made could incorporate an element of premium. The latter would possibly vary throughout the duration of the programme or for the different categories of the issuer's shares, which could be contrary to the principle of equal treatment 37 . In future, the Ta keover Board could therefore make the exemption of buyback programmes subject to proof that the latter could take place without an excessive influence on the market for the offeree's shares.
Mandatory Offers
The list of companies having adopted a clause of opting out or of opting up may be consulted on the Swiss Exchange Internet site 38 . The Takeover Board has indicated that it would enforce such clauses against minority shareholders, unless they are clearly invalid 39 . In order to be effective, an opting out or opting up clause must be entered on the Commercial Register at the time when the determinant threshold for the mandatory offer is exceeded 40 . An obligation to make an offer is triggered if the member of an organised group individually exceeds a shareholding threshold 41 . However, the member concerned may obtain an exemption if the nature of the group is not changed on that occasion 42 . According to the practice of the Takeover Board, this condition is in principle met if the control holding held by a 100% subsidiary is transferred to another 100% subsidiary of the same holding company 43 or if a control holding held by a company is transferred to its only shareholder 44 . It has happened that obligations to make an offer have been triggered unintentionally. In such cases the Takeover Board has requested the shareholders concerned to bring their holdings below the determining threshold. Their exceeding the threshold having been only temporary, it has then granted an exemption from the rules on mandatory offers 45 .
II. Disclosure of shareholdings
In principle the Disclosure Office of the Swiss Stock Exchange 46 does not publish its recommendations 47 . In exceptional cases it informs the public of its rulings by way of a communiqué. In addition, it publishes certain points of its practice through «notices», which may be consulted on its Internet site 48 . A database containing announcements published should also be available for consultation on the Internet in the course of this year.
The Disclosure Office has recently stated that the shareholders of companies listed after January 1, 1998 will not benefit from the transitional arrangements mentioned in art. 51 SESTA and art. 45.1 SESTO-FBC. Holdings higher than 5% must be announced at the time of listing, and not only at the end of the threeyear transitional period mentioned in art. 51 SESTA. However, the holdings mentioned in the listing prospectus do not need to be announced a second time in application of art. 20 SESTA 49 . Financial intermediaries may have a disclosure obligation distinct from that of their clients if they can exercise, autonomously, the right to vote in respect of the shares held for the account of the latter. In theory, this is not the case for institutions subject to the Federal Act on Banks and Professional Asset Managers 50 , nor is it for nominee companies that hold shares in a fiduciary capacity for the account of third parties 51 pital or to the capital in free float. In particular, treasury stocks held by the issuer are not deducted from the total capital 54 . The federal regulations on the disclosure of shareholdings do not contain particular provisions for the trading portfolios of securities dealers. The Disclosure Office has also refused to subject generally these shareholdings to particular rules. In one particular case, it has nevertheless agreed to relax the legal requirements in favour of a securities dealer -Olayan Investments Company Establishment -which had disclosed a holding of more than 5% of the votes of Credit Suisse Group and expected that its holding would fluctuate around this point in the future. The Disclosure Office exempted Olayan from making new announcements so long as its holding remained in a corridor situated between 4.5% and 10% of voting rights 55 .
In the context of the merger between Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of Switzerland, the Disclosure Office considered that the two companies were not acting in concert until the execution of the merger and could therefore continue to disclose their holdings separately 56 .
III. Squeeze out
The first rulings given in this field brought to light the procedural difficulties caused by the cancellation of the outstanding securities after a public takeover offer («squeeze out») 57 . The instruments of cantonal civil procedure do not seem to be well adapted to this type of procedure 58 . The most delicate point for the judge to decide is on the compensation or indemnity which should be paid to shareholders whose shares are cancelled in a procedure to which they are not necessarily party. The Zurich commercial court refused to decide on such a compensation, deeming that the defendant company lacked capacity to be sued 59 . However, the commercial court of the Canton of St. Gallen arrived at the opposite conclusion, and decided on the amount of the indemnity for minority shareholders at the same time as it declared the cancellation of the remaining shares 60 . This controversy should soon be of historical interest only, since the Zurich commercial court seems to restrict the double procedure to the sole case where the squeeze out is based on the transitional provisions of the Stock Exchange Act 61 ; the action based on art. 33 SESTA could in any case be handled in a single procedure 62 .
IV. Concluding remarks
The Swiss securities regulations are at present characterized by the large number of authorities mandated with their implementation: the FBC, the Takeover Board, the civil judge, the Disclosure Office and other departments of the stock exchanges, all having to apply autonomously rules which are often comparable. Inconsistency and contradiction may be the result. A simplification of the implementation system would, without doubt, be in the joint interest of the investors, the regulators, and the Swiss financial market as a whole 63 .
